Can a nation be truly free and independent if it doesn’t possess a nuclear arsenal?
That question is being answered right now, on the battlefields of eastern Ukraine. If a nation’s conventional military can stop an aggressive, nuclear-armed nation in a defensive struggle, then there is hope for the viability of conventional deterrence.
If, however, a conventionally armed nation is doomed to fail — because it lacks the resources (including the allies) to defend itself — then look for more countries to pursue nuclear weapons. They will choose self-defense over subservience.
So far, most of the discussion of the risk of nuclear war in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been focused on a perceived immediate danger — that Russia will use nuclear weapons to achieve victory on the battlefield or to retaliate for Ukraine’s use of Western weapons on Russian soil.
The hovering threat of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is one explanation for the Trump administration’s shocking weakness in its dealings with Russia. It will stand tall when confronting allies like Denmark, Canada, Mexico and Panama. It will threaten war crimes when dealing with a puny, diminished military force like Hamas.
But regarding Russia? Consider the following news items from the past few days.
President Donald Trump initially refused to promise that he would even include Ukraine in his negotiations with Russia, as if Ukraine were a mere pawn on the chessboard. (He reversed himself and said later that “of course” Ukraine would have a place at the table.)
He spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday, an event Russians celebrated. The Russian stock market soared, and a Russian lawmaker said the call “broke the West’s blockade.”
On Thursday, he said that he wanted to have Russia brought back into the Group of 7 — a gathering of the world powers — and said it was a “mistake to throw them out.” He said that if Russia had still been in the group, we “wouldn’t have had the problem with Ukraine.”
Yet Russia’s prior inclusion in the G7 (then called the G8) did not stop its aggression. Russia was suspended indefinitely from the group after its first invasion of Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. Russia was entirely willing to invade a neighboring country even when it was included in the world’s most elite club of nations.
On Wednesday, Pete Hegseth, the secretary of defense, appeared to preemptively abandon a number of key Ukrainian demands. He declared that Ukraine would not join NATO and that it was an “illusionary goal” to believe that Ukraine would be able to claw back its lost territory.
The next day, Hegseth walked back his statement and said that “everything is on the table” when Trump is negotiating.
Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that Hegseth’s statements and reversals were a “rookie mistake.” He also said, “I don’t know who wrote the speech. It is the kind of thing Tucker Carlson could have written, and Carlson is a fool.”
On Thursday, Vice President JD Vance adopted a harsher tone toward Russia, saying, “There are economic tools of leverage — there are, of course, military tools of leverage” that could be used to force Russia to reach an agreement.
The administration’s messaging was inconsistent and chaotic, but one thing was clear: Trump and Hegseth had floated significant concessions even before formal negotiations were underway.
Europeans can see what’s happening. They are realizing that they’re going to have to bulk up their defenses and are now planning to perhaps fight alone, without the United States, in a potential future conflict with Russia.
A large number of Trump supporters think that all this is good. They think that the chaos keeps other nations off balance and that the United States is finally stepping back from being the world’s policeman. Europe is stepping up and paying its fair share. And we’re also recognizing the grim reality in Ukraine: It can’t win, and thus stopping the conflict is the most urgent priority.
While I do want our allies to spend more on their defense, it’s one thing to ask them to do so as our partners. It’s another thing entirely for them to rearm without American security guarantees and without reliable American support.
I see the events of the past week, and I see weakness — weakness that makes a world war (including a potential nuclear exchange) more likely, not less.
Think of it like this: Will our abandoned allies be content with vassal status in the face of aggressive, nuclear-armed powers such as Russia, China and (to a lesser extent) North Korea? Or will they seek their own ultimate security guarantee, the nuclear weapon that would render any invasion of their sovereign territory utter madness?
Why wouldn’t South Korea pursue a nuclear deterrent? Could an enormous strategic shift overcome even Japan’s deep-seated resistance to nuclear weapons? Poland is in the middle of an intense and expensive military buildup, but wouldn’t an atomic arsenal make it even more secure?
It may seem far-fetched to imagine rampant nuclear proliferation, but we know that Iran is responding to its military defeats by redoubling its efforts to build a bomb. India and Pakistan maintain their own nuclear arsenals, rendering one of the world’s most volatile military rivalries incalculably more dangerous.
After the U.S. military and its coalition allies swept through Saddam Hussein’s immense ground army in a 100-hour offensive during Operation Desert Storm, Krishnaswamy Sundarji, a former chief of staff of the Indian army, said, “One principal lesson of the Gulf War is that if a state intends to fight the United States, it should avoid doing so until and unless it possesses nuclear weapons.”
If that’s the sentiment of countries that might face the United States, how much more will it be the sentiment of countries that face looming threats from Russia and China?
America’s potential retreat coincides with a rise in right-wing nationalism in Europe, a movement that is not known for its pacifism or for its willingness to engage in multilateral cooperation. So now we’re looking at a potential new arms race, in which it’s not just the rogue states like Iran that will succumb to the nuclear temptation.
In 1905, George Santayana wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” But maybe he didn’t have it quite right. As we watch Europe begin to rearm at a time when the last World War II veterans are passing on, I wonder if he was a bit too optimistic. Perhaps the reality is that those who haven’t experienced the past are condemned to repeat it.
I’ve thought about this concept in the case of vaccines, too. If you remember polio or if you remember how deadly childhood measles can be, then vaccination is a small price to pay for health. But if you have no memory of the terrible toll that infectious diseases can take, then the vaccine is all pain (the shot hurts, side effects can be unpleasant) for no perceived gain.
A similar idea applies to national security. Years of effective deterrence can lead to complacency. You feel the fiscal pain of large-scale defense expenditures, but you’ve lost any sense of the gain. Great-power peace can start to feel like the default human condition and not a historical aberration created by a series of deliberate diplomatic and military choices.
The genius of the U.S.-led world order is that at our best, we preserved both peace and national autonomy. We didn’t want vassals. We wanted allies. In fact, when we created vassals (the governments of South Vietnam and Afghanistan come to mind), the alliance was unstable. But Russia and China don’t want allies. They want vassals.
Last summer, I wrote a piece explaining why I was going to vote for a Democrat for president. One of the central reasons was the preservation of NATO and the defeat of Russian aggression.
I was concerned that if America abandoned Ukraine, not only would we encourage more aggression from nuclear states toward non-nuclear states (I’m very concerned about China and Taiwan), but we would also create dangerous incentives for nuclear proliferation.
The first weeks of the Trump presidency are, to put it mildly, vindicating my concerns. Like a schoolyard bully who’s afraid of his peers, Trump is tough on Canada but weak on Russia. And that weakness may not just cost Ukraine its independence; it could set the stage for a cataclysm.
This article originally appeared in The New York Times.
