As tension grows between Israel and Hezbollah, the dominant political and military force in Lebanon, neither side wants a full-scale war. But one could explode inadvertently — precipitated by the recent attacks on the Golan Heights and on Hezbollah and Hamas leaders — or deliberately, should Israel see a post-Gaza opportunity to rid itself of another one of its enemies.
In the best case, a cease-fire in Israel’s war on Hamas in Gaza would prompt Hezbollah to stop firing rockets into the Jewish state, and the possibility of war in Lebanon would fade.
But tensions rose starting on Saturday, with the launch of what Israel said was a Hezbollah missile that hit Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights on Saturday and killed 12 children and teenagers. Israel responded by hitting a building in Beirut on Tuesday, saying it targeted the Hezbollah commander it believes was responsible. The next day, a top Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was assassinated in Tehran; Hamas and Iran accused Israel, which has not commented on the report.
If Israel goes further and launches a major operation to uproot Hezbollah, which right-wing members of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government have been urging, it would be devastating.
The conflict would eviscerate Lebanese society, which is already in a state of economic collapse, spark a humanitarian crisis for which the United States and others will have to pick up the tab, generate increased attacks against U.S. interests in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere, and propel violence by Houthi forces in Yemen to higher levels. It will likely also fail to eliminate Hezbollah.
None of this is in the United States’ interest. While making clear that it would continue to defend Israel against direct attacks by Iran, Hezbollah’s patron, Washington needs to make clear to Israel that it will not sanction such a war or facilitate it by supplying munitions, joining the Israeli military in attacks against Hezbollah or providing diplomatic cover for the deaths of civilians.
As the conflagration in Gaza demonstrated, trying to control this train after it has left the station will not work.
There are several reasons a war across Israel’s northern border would be appalling. Hezbollah’s forces and weaponry are embedded in civilian life, in what many consider a human shield strategy; as a result, attacks could kill tens of thousands of Lebanese. The artificial intelligence targeting system used by the Israel Defense Forces and the permissive engagement rules it showed in Gaza will also take an inordinate civilian toll. Hezbollah, like Hamas, has dug underground bunkers and tunnels, so expect mayhem in urban areas.
In theory, Israel could target all of Hezbollah’s estimated 130,000-150,000 missiles and rockets, plus its launchers and crews, which are distributed throughout Lebanon. Since Hezbollah headquarters are in a suburb of Beirut, residents will be exposed to withering fire. Because Israel knows that destroying Hezbollah’s armaments is pointless as long as resupplies from Iran are possible, it will likely seal off parts of Lebanon, preventing food and other necessities from reaching many civilians.
So far, the United States has discouraged Israel from going to war against Hezbollah largely by emphasizing the costs to Israel. But one can safely assume that the administration does not want to take the rap for another humanitarian tragedy.
If the Biden administration fails to stop Israel from waging war on Hezbollah, it will come under political pressure to support Israel’s operations.
In 2006, during Israel’s last foray against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the United States pressured Israel to spare Lebanese civilians and infrastructure and end combat operations prematurely. Israel has long regarded that restraint as a reason for the nation’s failure to decisively weaken Hezbollah. Now that Israel has tested a scorched earth policy in Gaza and retained U.S. support, it likely won’t repeat its presumed mistake of 2006. Gaza rules will apply.
Optimistic outsiders discount the possibility of a large Israeli attack because they think it would be doomed and assume that Israelis think so, too. But that is a bad assumption. From a military planner’s perspective, Israel could exploit the advantages of a surprise attack, which can be quite effective.
The conditions for surprise are favorable. A sizable force, enough to get a start and easily reinforced, is already at its jump-off point. Continuing exchanges of fire provide the perfect cover. Hezbollah cannot know whether the latest round is the opening of an Israeli offensive or just more of the same. And there are few civilians in Israel’s north for the I.D.F. to worry about, given that some 60,000 people have been evacuated from the area in the face of barrages from Hezbollah, along with around 90,000 from southern Lebanon.
As for Hezbollah’s vast missile inventory, the element of surprise and proximity of Israeli air bases to its targets could enable the Israeli air force to pre-empt missile launches on its land. Synchronized ground maneuvers will help. An air defense umbrella augmented by American weapons will limit risk to the home front. Air defenses could be concentrated around the small, dense set of Israeli critical infrastructure installations to avert catastrophic damage, although many missiles could still get through, possibly killing hundreds of Israelis.
The Biden administration should put an end to such thinking — and be blunt that Israeli promises of a restrained war will have little credibility after nearly 40,000 dead in Gaza, according to Palestinian health authorities, and the vast destruction there.
If Israel moves ahead with plans to wage war on Hezbollah and the militant force does unleash thousands of missiles on Israel, then it had better hope that its missile defenses and civil defense capabilities are up to snuff. The United States has the capacity to take down advanced Iranian missiles, which it would do, but not necessarily to bail out an Israel swamped by Hezbollah’s missiles thanks to an unrealistic war plan.
Beyond ongoing if futile diplomacy to get Hezbollah’s cooperation and acknowledging Israel’s right to self-defense, a cease-fire in Gaza is the surest way to defuse tensions in the North. This is now a race against the clock.
One hopes that Israel’s response to a pre-emptive “no” from Washington would be to shelve plans for an all-out offensive. It is possible that Mr. Netanyahu would mobilize supporters in Congress as well as the Trump campaign to hammer the administration and compel it to pledge support for whatever Israel chooses to do in Lebanon.
It is, after all, an election year, and the political cost of defying the Israeli government might not be worth it for the Harris campaign.
But there are risks for Israel, as well. Should Israel decide to take on the administration now and Vice President Kamala Harris wins the election, angry Democrats will complicate the U.S.-Israel relationship.
By insisting on a more equal partnership with Israel now, the administration might just be buying time. But in the Middle East, that’s not necessarily a bad thing.
Steven Simon is a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and a distinguished fellow and professor at Dartmouth College. He served on the National Security Council in the Clinton and Obama administrations. His latest book is “Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East.” This article originally appeared in The New York Times.